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Abstract 
There is widespread agreement that Cloud computing 
has proven cost cutting and agility benefits. However, 
security and regulatory compliance issues are 
continuing to challenge the wide acceptance of such 
technology both from social and commercial 
stakeholders.  An important factor behind this is the fact 
that Clouds, and in particular public Clouds, are usually 
deployed and used within broad geographical or even 
international domains. This implies that the exchange of 
private and other protected data within the Cloud 
environment would be governed by multiple 
jurisdictions. These jurisdictions have a great degree of 
harmonisation, however, they present possible conflicts 
that are difficult to negotiate at run time. So far, 
important efforts have been taken in order to deal with 
regulatory compliance management for large distributed 
systems. However, measurable solutions are required 
for the context of Cloud. In this position paper, we 
propose an approach that starts with a conceptual model 
of explicit regulatory requirements for exchanging 
private data on a multijurisdictional environment and 
build on it in order to define metrics for non-
compliance or risks to compliance. These metrics will 
be integrated within usual data access-control policies 
and will be checked at policy analysis time before a 
decision to allow/deny the data access is made. 
Keywords: Cloud, Privacy, Data Access, Semantic 
Web, Requirements Engineering. 
1. Introduction 
Globalisation has changed the way societies and 
organisations work. As a consequence, technologies 
have had to evolve in order to be able to cope with new 
organisational needs. New concepts such as Cloud 
computing have emerged as approaches to mitigating 
the needs and facilitate those changes. However, the 
governance of such systems has to evolve for a 
multijurisdictional context. The complexity of such 
governance context makes it challenging to abstract and 
enforce applicable high level regulatory requirements as 
operational policies. On the plus side, if these 
challenges are tackled measurable compliance coverage 
on the Cloud would be possible. In this paper, we 
present an approach to bridging the gap between 
international regulatory frameworks on systems and 
data security and operational level policies for 
accessing computer resources through Cloud services.  
This approach is based on the semantic modelling of 
explicit legal requirements, which will be extracted 
from international legislation on systems and data 
security. This includes the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 
initiative in the United States and the Data Protection 
directive of the European Union. In this research, the 
aim is to build a generic model to enable the 
specification of these requirements in a standard way. 
In addition, the model should reflect both similarities 
and conflicts between the different legislations forming 
part of the Cloud’s governance framework. We further 
extend our model to capture prioritised non-compliance 
risks. This is done through the use of semantic rules that 
are complementary to our model. We finally integrate 
these risks as access control conditions. The satisfaction 
of these conditions would lead to denial of access to 
protected resources.   
The work on this paper builds on our previous efforts of 
an ontology-based approach to privacy compliance for 
the sharing of Health data in Europe. When completed, 
this work should add useful contributions to the area of 
regulatory compliance on Clouds domains. This 
includes: (1) the specification and formalisation of 
requirements extracted from diverse jurisdictions 
through the use of highly expressive semantic 
languages such as SWRL, RIF and LKIF; and (2) 
through the use of these formalisms, enabling the 
detection of situations of data disclosures or access that 
might present risks to regulatory compliance. This 
would allow the prevention of non-compliance at access 
control run time.  
This paper is structured as follows. After presenting an 
introduction in Section 1, Section 2 describes the 
proposed approach. In Section 3, we present the 
methodology which we are following to undertake this 
research. Section 4 covers the related work; and finally, 
the conclusions and future work are presented in 
Section 5. 
2. Description of Proposed Research 
Cloud computing allows efficient cost cutting through 
the use of custom-tailored, on-demand IT solutions. 
However, Cloud providers are still failing to guarantee 
measurable handling of many non-functional 
requirements, such as security and regulatory 
compliance [4]. Although they are newly emerging 
paradigms, Clouds are very similar in many aspects to 
other distributed computing environments. In particular, 
Clouds are similar to large scale systems that are based 
on virtualised technologies such as grid systems [24]. 
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These systems often fall short of providing measurable 
proof of compliance. The presence of such 
shortcomings may lead to decreased social trust and 
acceptance and therefore low business engagement with 
the Cloud business case [21]. In this research, we aim to 
specify and to enforce access control policies that allow 
the identification of compliance vulnerabilities at policy 
evaluation time. In our context, situations of 
compliance vulnerabilities will be specified through 
extending a model of traceable requirements extracted 
from high level policies. This latter is to be specified at 
an early stage of the research. Finally, the captured risks 
will be integrated as access control conditions.  
We aim to achieve these research objectives by 
following a phased but iterative approach shown as 
Figure 1. In the first phase, we shall extract enforceable 
requirements from different security and trust 
legislation that form part of the legal framework of 
Cloud computing, including SOX [23] and privacy and 
data protection legislation. Due to the diversity and 
scope of this legislation, this research starts with a deep 
analysis of the legal requirements for sharing protected 
resources on the Cloud. Throughout this analysis, 
similarities as well as possible space for conflict 
between different legislation will be identified. We also 
consider for scalability concerns, identifying a selection 
of legal requirements with a high priority for 
enforcement. 
 
 
Figure 1: A Proposed Roadmap to Enforce Compliant Access Control (Denial of Access)  
In the second phase, we conceptually model the legal 
requirements identified in the previous phase. In 
addition, we specify and model situations of non-
compliance with these requirements. The modelling 
language we are using for these tasks should be 
expressive enough in order to handle uncertainty and 
contradictions of legislation. The complexity of such 
issues scales when working on multijurisdictional 
and/or multicultural domains of which we believe 
internationalised CClouds are an example. It is 
therefore necessary to look at a semantic language that 
is the most expressive and the most complete among the 
other languages constituting the semantic web stack 
[29]. One possible choice could be for the Web 
Ontology Language (OWL) and the Semantic Web rule 
Language (SWRL). However, in general (independently 
from the chosen rule language) the rules would be 
specified in the form of production rules, which capture 
information about the generic case of data disclosure as 
rule antecedent and dictate either a single legal 
requirement or a conjunction of requirements in their 
consequence. The following is an example of a privacy 
requirements rule indicating the necessity of obtaining 
patient consent when disclosing private data coming 
originally from France: 
    dataSharing(?x) 
∧ concerning(?x, ?data)  
∧ belongsto(?data, France)  
∧  isPrivate(?d)  
→ hasConsentNecessityRequirement(?x, 
NecessaryConsent) 
In addition to requirements specification rules we also 
define rules that derive metrics for detecting risks to 
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compliance with a legal requirement. For this reason, 
we need first to define metrics for testing for the 
satisfaction of each requirement. For example, we 
define a metric:  PatientConsent(X, obtainedConsent); 
presented in the form of an OWL axiom that checks for 
the satisfaction of the consent necessity requirements 
for a specific data disclosure X. In the cases where the 
requirement of necessary consent is not satisfied this 
means that the patient consent was not obtained prior to 
the data disclosure or the consent was obtained to 
operate for a specific period of time but has expired. 
Hence, one of the following axioms will hold true 
PatientConsent(X, NoConsent) or PatientConsent(X, 
ExpiredConsent). The applicable risk derivation rules 
for this example are presented as follows:  
   dataSharing(?x) 
∧ hasConsentNecessityRequirement(?x, 
NecessaryConsent) 
→ hasComplianceRisk(?x, NoConsent) 
OR 
   dataSharing(?x)  
∧ hasConsentNecessityRequirement(?x,   
NecessaryConsent)  
→ hasComplianceRisk(?x, ExpiredConsent) 
The work we have done previously in (Rahmouni, 
2011) attempted to model and formalise EU legislation 
on data protection through an OWL plus SWRL 
knowledgebase, while addressing some of the 
ambiguities and contradictions characterising it. This 
has allowed reasoning about policies from different 
European Member States (Rahmouni, 2009). However, 
despite its high expressiveness capability, SWRL has 
some limitations in  fully handling the non-
monotonicity of legislation. In other words, the 
absence, negation and other non-monotonic operations 
deprives SWRL from natively reasoning on conflicting 
rules.  
In order to overcome this efficiency we had to 
programmatically set a priority for rule execution by 
borrowing the “salience” keyword which is a reserved 
keyword of the rule engine that was used to execute the 
rules. In this research, we intend to explore an extension 
to SWRL or a change to a different semantic rule 
language such as RIF or LKIF. The work in (Gordon et 
al., 2009 and Palmirani et al., 2009) provides a 
comparison of the ability of different semantic rule 
languages for regulation modelling. Also the work in 
(Estrella, 2010) proposes LKIF, an extension to SWRL, 
as a better approach to dealing with non-monotonicity 
issues of legislation. This is because the LKIF rule 
language includes a built-in predicate which is enforced 
over rules and allows reasoning about rule priority for 
execution where conflicting rules are found. 
In the third phase, the semantically captured 
compliance risks could be mapped to metrics forming 
part of the access control conditions that are usually 
specified in a standard access control language such as 
XACML. In [20] and [21], we have shown how we 
model high level policies interpreted from European 
and national data protection law as privacy compliant 
access control policies. The use of semantic web 
technologies such as OWL and SWRL to allow 
integration of privacy constraints extracted from law as 
policy constraints, such as the requirements of consent 
and other safeguards of patient rights. In this previous 
work, we have checked for compliance at policy 
evaluation time by considering the positive 
authorisation mode. We believe that the process of 
checking for non-compliance, as suggested in this 
paper, would be more practical and efficient than the 
process of checking for compliance. For example, 
consider a specified sharing X of some protected 
resources on the Cloud. We suppose that X has a set of 
legal requirements with which a user must comply. In 
order to decide whether X is compliant, we need to 
check that each of the applicable requirements was 
satisfied. If so X would be permitted. In contrast, fewer 
checking operations are needed in order to measure 
non-compliance. This is because it is sufficient to know 
that at least one requirement from the set of 
requirements applicable to X was not satisfied, in order 
to infer non-compliance. 
At a later stage, the mapping of compliance risks to 
access control metrics would facilitate the integration of 
our approach within existing access control models, 
which manage access to protected data on CCloud 
infrastructures. However, these legacy models might 
require extensions in order to be able to process 
complex and dynamic constraints specified in our data 
access and usage polices. This is handled in the next 
phase.  
Finally in a fourth phase, we will design a prototype 
architecture for the enforcement of the suggested access 
control. In addition, we will implement the prototype 
and test it with regards to a specific case study (e.g. 
business enterprises, healthcare, etc.). We believe this 
approach would provide a preventative method for 
compliance management. Moreover, it provides 
mechanisms to allow enterprises working with Cloud 
infrastructures to adopt a measurable way of enforcing 
high level legislation within their operational processes. 
The abilities to detect vulnerable disclosures and to 
prevent them happening would also increase the level of 
social trust and acceptance of the Cloud paradigm. 
Furthermore, a tailored retrospective mechanism for 
auditing compliance at the time of access or usage 
control will also be considered in the future.  
3. Research Methodology 
For this research, we aim to follow the structured 
framework of Legal Knowledge Engineering and 
Enforcement ‘[REF?]. This framework will be driven 
by an ontology of predefined data disclosure models 
along with an ontology of legal privacy and security 
requirements. In addition, our research framework 
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includes three more layers that lead to the final stage of 
enforcing risk-aware access control policies in the 
Cloud operational processes. In total, our framework 
contains five layers as shown in Figure 2. In the 
following sections we present these layers in more 
detail.  
Most layers of this framework synchronise with the 
different phases of TUREP [15], which is a software 
engineering process that is very close to a universal and 
integrated requirement engineering framework. The 
TUREP model was proven successful in paving the way 
for a universal requirements engineering process 
through the involvement of its key characteristics as 
adhering to the engineering dimension. In particular, 
TUREP is in line with other research projects that have 
attempted to bridge the gap between business processes 
and system/data models and requirements 
specifications. These include BPMOntoSOA [32] (a 
semantic-based approach to generating service oriented 
requirements specifications from business process 
models), OntoREM [13, 14] (an ontology or knowledge 
driven requirements engineering methodology applied 
in the aerospace sector), OntoRAT [2] (an ontology 
driven requirements analysis tool) and generating 
conceptual data models from knowledge models such as 
OWL-DL models [7]. Therefore, these research projects 
are considered as part of the building blocks to 
developing an integrated but generalised framework 
with the TUREP model at the centre in attempting to 
evolve a universal integrated framework for 
requirements engineering. 
However, in order to satisfy the research problem 
discussed in this paper our framework includes an 
additional layer where we look at mapping legal 
requirements onto metrics representing risks for non-
compliance. These are also called compliance 
vulnerabilities.  
It is also worth mentioning before proceeding into the 
detailed description of the framework’s layers that due 
to the diversity and complexity of the different 
legislation (that forms part of the governance of 
disclosure of protected data across international 
borders) we consider restricting our focus to privacy 
legislation only, in particular, legislation governing the 
exchange of health data. This includes for example, the 
European Directive on Data protection and some US 
legislation such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA). The following sections 
present more details on the framework layers (as shown 
in Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: An Ontology-Driven Framework for Legal Requirements and Risks Engineering for the Exchange of Private 
Data on a Cloud Environment  
3.1.1. The Modelling Layer 
The modelling layer focuses on the design and 
production of a semantic model or an ontology of 
specified cases of data disclosures that take place within 
an international Cloud environment. In particular, we 
semantically represent cases of disclosures of data 
revealing information about a person’s health. 
Moreover, in this phase we also gather generic 
requirements described in text law. These requirements 
are then analysed according to their relevance to our 
domain (i.e. the health domain and the relevance of the 
data type to cases of data disclosures we are interested 
in). Furthermore, due to the need to narrow down the 
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scope to the time consuming nature of semantic 
modelling, the gathered requirements will be prioritised 
according to their importance to the task of effective 
data protection and privacy preservation. For example, 
the requirements of obtaining patient consent prior to 
disclosing their data seems to have higher importance 
compared to data anonymisation, which is important 
but not always required. After prioritisation, these 
requirements will be captured in an ontology or 
knowledge base. Both ontologies (i.e. the data 
disclosure context ontology and the privacy 
requirements ontology) set up the context for the 
domain for which we later formally specify applicable 
and fine grained legal requirements.  
This phase is in line with the initial phase of the 
TUREP model in which the requirements should be 
gathered, elicited and analysed. The next layer of the 
framework focuses on the formal specification of legal 
requirements and risks to compliance.  
3.1.2. The Generalisation Layer 
In this layer, we effectuate a set of tasks that focus on 
the generalisation of the context of data sharing or the 
disclosure which were specified in the previous layer. 
Each specific case of data disclosure will be mapped to 
a generic data processing context that is specified in 
text law. This is in order to conform to the nature of 
legislation that is generic in the way it is written, but 
has to be implemented or enforced in a case based 
manner. In this regard, we generalise our specialised 
cases of data disclosure in order to be able to match 
each of them onto a set of applicable legal requirements 
that has to be complied with before the disclosure is 
permitted.  
3.1.3. The Meta-Model Layer 
This layer illustrates a phase in which generic templates 
for requirements specification are formulated. Since we 
are dealing with legal requirements which are by nature 
specified, in text law, in the form of rules, it is more 
logical to formulate these requirements through the use 
of formal or logical rules, notably production rules. 
These rules capture information about the generic case 
of data disclosure and would dictate either a single 
requirement or a conjunction of requirements in their 
consequence. These generic rules will be instantiated, at 
a later stage, in order to specify the requirements 
applicable for specialised cases of data disclosure.  
In addition to requirements specification we also 
specify risks to compliance with these requirements in a 
way that allows, for each production rule specifying a 
requirement, associating it with a set of other rules 
defining risks to compliance with that specific 
requirement. The requirements specification and risk 
derivation rules will be used in the next phase of the 
framework in order to automatically generate applicable 
risk detection metrics. These metrics will serve to 
identify attempts to non-compliance at data access 
runtime. 
3.1.4. The Compliance Vulnerabilities 
Generation Layer 
In this layer, the rules produced as an output of the 
previous phase will be executed through adequate rule 
engines in order to derive applicable legal requirements. 
For example, in the context of disclosing a patient’s 
chest MRI, where the MRI was originally collected 
from a French hospital, the applicable requirements 
along with risks to complying with these requirements 
will be generated (as described in Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Example of legal requirements and risk derived for a given disclosure of a patient’s MRI. 
 
3.1.5. Enforcement Layer 
The fifth and final layer of our research framework 
looks at the enforcement of compliance requirements 
through the integration of risk metrics within the 
specification of access control policies governing the 
operational processes of the Cloud’s platforms. These 
metrics will be included in the conditions, which 
normally form part of formal policies specification. The 
conditions describing the satisfaction of a risky 
situation or compliance vulnerability will be checked at 
run time i.e. when a policy decision is being made. If at 
least one risk metric is validated during this check then 
the applicable decision will be a denial of access and/or 
disclosure of the protected data. 
Data Disclosure Subject Legal requirements Legal Risks 
Type of Data to be disclosed: 
patient’s chest MRI 
Country: France  
 Consent Necessity 
Necessary-Consent 
 
Consent Necessity 
No-Consent or Expired-Consent 
 
 Consent Specificity 
Specific Consent 
 
Consent Specificity 
Broad Consent 
 
 Consent Explicitness 
Explicit-Consent 
 
Consent Explicitness 
Implicit-Consent 
 
6 
 
4. Related Work 
Since there is only limited work on compliance 
management in Clouds, in this section we focus on 
related areas such as compliance management in 
general i.e. in the software development life cycle and 
at policy enforcement time. Moreover, we also cover 
the state-of-the-art in formal policies and regulation 
specification and enforcement languages.  
4.1. Compliance Management Approaches 
Most of the existing work in the area of compliance 
management deals with a particular problem of 
compliance auditing. This includes for example, 
Hippocratic databases [1] and some semantic web-
based approaches such as [31] and [9]. These 
approaches however are not sufficient for our study. We 
believe that in order to achieve effective compliance 
management we need not only to rely on retrospective 
approaches, but complementary proactive approaches 
are also needed in order to show adoption of good 
practice and more assurance for compliance. Examples 
of these approaches are described in [22], [20] and [11]. 
The work in [22] and [20] had particular emphasis in 
European privacy legislation, whereas Gowadia [11] 
looked at integrating requirements interpreted from 
data-sharing agreements. We believe that relying on 
secondary legislations such as contracts, protocols and 
agreement does not guarantee completeness of 
compliance when compared to primary text law. The 
research presented in [22] does not check for 
compliance with explicit fine grained legal 
requirements extracted from legislation, rather only 
generic requirements interpreted from high level legal 
principles have been considered.    
In particular, our work presented earlier in [21] attempts 
to model and formalise EU Legislation through an 
OWL plus SWRL knowledgebase. The approach 
however had some limitations linked to the inability of 
SWRL to fully handle the non-monotonicity of 
legislation. The reason for these limitations was 
explained in section 2 of this paper. In this current 
research, we intend to explore an extension to SWRL or 
a change to a different semantic rule language such as 
RIF or LKIF in order to deal with these limitations.  
In [20] and [21], we have shown how we model high 
level policies interpreted from European and national 
data protection law as privacy compliant access control 
policies. The use of semantic web technologies such as 
OWL and SWRL allowed the integration of privacy 
constraints extracted from law, such as requirements of 
consent and other safeguards of patient rights, as policy 
constraints. Also, this solution has permitted the 
checking for requirements satisfaction at run time and 
makes an access control decision according to the 
finding. We believe it would be more practical and less 
time demanding if we manage to detect, at run time, 
situations of non-compliance and prevent them 
happening. That is the object of this work. 
4.2. Formal Policy and Regulation 
Enforcement Languages 
High level legal rules need to be interpreted at an 
operational level so that specific decisions induced by 
events can be taken. For this purpose, we need to 
investigate the expressiveness and ability of some 
promising policy languages that have been 
advantageous in the mapping of requirements from 
privacy laws and also guidelines into operational 
controls. After going through some data protection 
legislation, we noticed that the legislation mainly 
dictates requirements and expectations that need to be 
fulfilled by a data controller throughout the whole 
lifecycle of the management of the personal data in 
question. These requirements could be classified into 
two categories (1) obligations related to the access and 
usage of personal data based on the data subject’s 
consent and/or complying with pre-identified usage 
purposes and (2) obligations to be fulfilled on the 
collected data such as data retention, deletion and 
correction, notification to the data subject, secondary 
use of data and data transfer to third parties.  
A considerable amount of work has been done in the 
area of security policy languages. However, many of 
these approaches have mainly captured the access 
control aspects of these obligations and do not focus on 
the duties and the expectations on how personal data 
has to be handled. Some approaches have shown 
awareness of the need to deal with other aspects of the 
obligations than just access control obligations but they 
usually stop at the specification of these controls or 
tried to enforce them only at local domains where the 
data resides. This gives less control and traceability on 
how data will be handled after the access is permitted 
and data is transferred to an external domain. In the 
following sections, a review of different categories of 
formal policy languages is presented that have been 
used to enforce security and privacy controls. 
4.2.1. Semantic-based Languages 
A semantic-based description of policies through an 
ontology allows easy access to the policies’ information 
and facilitates capturing the relations between policies, 
entities and other policies. It is also possible to query an 
ontology in order to get useful information. This is 
rather different from traditional languages that define 
only predefined queries in order to access information 
about policies. However, most of the languages that 
have been designed so far rely on a pure OWL syntax. 
These policies present some limitations in terms of 
expressiveness, which is in turn inherited from known 
limitations. Moreover, as in all ontology-based systems, 
keeping up with version changes to the ontologies as 
well as the integration and interoperability between 
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different ontologies in the same domain continues to be 
an open research area.  
Rei [12] is a policy framework that allows specification, 
analysis and reasoning about declarative policies. Rei 
adopts a rule-based approach to specifying semantic 
policies. Rules are expressed as OWL properties of the 
policy and are classified as rights, prohibitions, 
obligations and dispensations. Though represented in 
OWL-Lite, Rei still allows the definition of variables 
that are used as placeholders, as in Prolog [26]. The 
definition of constraints follows the typical pattern of 
rule-based programming languages, like Prolog, i.e. 
defining a variable and the required value of that 
variable for the constraint to be satisfied. In this way, 
Rei overcomes one of the major limitations of the OWL 
language and more generally of description logics, i.e. 
the inability to define variables. On the other hand, the 
choice of expressing Rei rules similarly to declarative 
logic programs prevents it from exploiting the full 
potential of the OWL language. OWL inference is 
essentially considered as an oracle, i.e. the Rei policy 
engine treats inferences from OWL axioms as a virtual 
fact base. Hence, Rei rules cannot be exploited in the 
reasoning process that infers new conclusions from the 
existing OWL ontologies, which means that the Rei 
engine is able to reason about domain-specific 
knowledge, but not about policy specification. 
Therefore, in order to classify policies, the variables in 
the rules need to be instantiated, which reduces it to a 
constraint satisfiability problem.  
The KAoS [25] framework through its policy services 
allows the specification, management, conflict 
resolution and enforcement of policies within agent 
domains. KAoS adopts an OWL-DL ontology-based 
approach to describing and specifying policies and 
context conditions. The ontological modelling of the 
policies helps reasoning about both domain and policy 
specification and facilitates the detection of policy 
conflicts at policy definition time. However, a pure 
OWL approach encounters some difficulties with regard 
to the definition of some kinds of policies. Also the gap 
between the specification and the actual implementation 
of such policies cannot be coped with automatically 
[27]. The lack of facilities to describe variables makes it 
difficult to define policies that contain parametric 
constraints, which are assigned a value only at 
deployment or runtime. For this reason, KAoS 
developers have introduced role-value maps as OWL 
extensions, which allow KAoS to specify constraints 
between properties’ values expressed in OWL terms 
and to define policy sets i.e. groups of policies that 
share a common definition but can be singularly 
instantiated with different parameters. The proposed 
extensions effectively add sufficient expressive 
flexibility to KAoS to represent the policies discussed 
in this paper. However, non-experienced users may still 
have difficulties in writing and understanding these 
policies without the help of the KPAT [25] graphical 
user interface. 
4.2.2. XML-based Privacy Policy Languages 
Some XML-based policy languages were formalised 
originally for the purpose of specifying operational 
controls to the access of protected data in general, but 
they evolved to formally represent some policies of 
legal aspects and, in particular, legal privacy and data 
protection policies.  
The work on the Platform for Privacy Preferences 
Project by W3C has lead to the production of the P3P 
[16] specification. P3P enables users to express privacy 
practices of their websites in a standard format that can 
be retrieved automatically by user agents. P3P user 
agents allow users to be informed of site practices (in 
both machine and human-readable formats) and to 
automate decision-making based on these practices 
when appropriate [5]. However, there are some 
shortcomings associated with the enforceability of P3P 
policies such as (1) predefined types of purposes for 
allowing access to personal data make it difficult for 
organizations to define their own purposes (2) 
unavailability of read, write, delete, append actions (3) 
P3P does not use or specify any post processing 
obligations such as notification to data subject, or 
retention of data for a specified period and (4) P3P has 
limited conditions of data processing i.e. simple opt in/ 
opt out conditions [3]. 
The Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language 
(EPAL) [18] was designed to enable the translation of 
privacy policies into an XML based computer language. 
The resulting coded translation of human policy into 
Information Technology policy allows a complex 
description of the internal data handling practices 
needed for enforcing the privacy policy. Similarly, 
XACML [30] is an XML specification and syntax for 
expressing policies controlling the access of 
information through the internet. XACML provides 
enterprises with a flexible and structured way of 
managing access to resources.  XACML is based on a 
subject-target-action-condition policy syntax applied to 
XML documents that can update individual document 
elements. Like other policies languages that are based 
on XML, XACML lacks the required semantics to 
allow for semantic heterogeneity and interoperability 
especially when managing data access within 
environments that involve multiple organisations.  
4.3. Other Formal Policy Languages and 
Techniques 
Other types of formal policy language that have 
recently emerged and that are worth mentioning 
aredeclarative languages that are written on a 
programming language syntax and are easier to 
integrate or embed in code snippets while developing 
applications or services that are meant to handle or 
manage protected data. One of the most famous 
examples of these languages is Ponder [6], which is a 
declarative object-oriented language for the 
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specification of management and security policies. It 
provides structuring techniques to serve the complexity 
of policy administration in large enterprise information 
systems. It has been recently extended to a more 
advanced version named Ponder2 [28]. This language 
offers a wide range of interesting models of concepts 
such as hierarchical data structure for organizing 
managed objects, a policy evaluation points (PEPs) 
scheme, and their conflict resolution strategy. 
Fundamentally, Ponder2 distinguishes between two 
policy types that are obligations and authorisations. 
Usually the obligation policies define the actions that 
policy subjects must perform on target entities when 
specific relevant events occur. Authorisation policies 
are usually used to specify operations a subject is 
authorised to do on target objects. Also, Ponder2 
includes some composite policy types that allow the 
grouping of basic policies into the shape of roles or 
relationships policies. However, the policy language of 
Ponder2 does not allow definition of obligation actions 
that must be executed before or after an authorisation.  
5. Conclusions 
The work presented in this position paper has been 
based on our previous work [20, 21], which presents an 
innovative approach to privacy compliance 
management for the sharing of Health data in Europe. 
In this work, we consider the problem of privacy 
compliance from a software engineering point of view 
where compliance is considered as a Non-Functional 
Requirement for distributed systems deployed at the 
international level e.g. International Clouds. As stated 
previously our methodology conforms to the TUREP 
[15] software engineering model that has proven 
successful and effective for structuring requirement 
engineering processes in different domains.  
The extension to our previous work include: (1) 
extending the geographical scope of the covered 
legislation from an European to an international level 
(2) adopting a more advance and expressive formal 
regulation specification language (3) detecting risks to 
compliance (also called compliance vulnerabilities) 
through the use of well defined metrics at access control 
runtime and preventing them from happening and 
finally (4) testing and validation of the proposed 
solution on a Cloud environment. Our future work will 
focus on putting our methodology into practice. For 
testing and validation purposes, a case study with rich 
scenarios of private data sharing in healthcare will be 
carefully selected and applied to the different layers of 
our requirements engineering framework. 
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